We investigate the relationship between measures of systematic risk, firm distress and pension risks. Our results show that systematic, default, financial and operational risks reflect the underlying risk of the pension scheme. Further, pension scheme asset allocation is consistent with active pension risk management. Managers therefore choose to undertake risk management of their pension risks as opposed to risk-shifting through asset substitution.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we analyse whether measures of systematic risk and firm distress reflect pension risks, and if managers manage these risks. Pension liabilities represent a very real risk to the ongoing operations of the firm. For many companies the size of the pension liability is large relative to both the market value and total assets of the firm.
Schemes with very low funding levels are likely to attract pressure from employees and pension fund trustees. Likewise, pension fund asset allocation can have a significant effect on the observed level of funding in a given year. Those pension schemes with large equity components will be more sensitive to funding ratio swings as the equity markets go up and down. To manage this risk, schemes can move out of volatile assets, such as equity, and into bonds to reduce volatility in the funding ratio. Rauh (2007) examines risk management and risk shifting in U.S. corporate defined benefit pension schemes and found that riskier firms, having higher credit risk, are more likely to invest in low risk debt securities as pension assets. This relationship is shown to be present both cross-sectionally and through time. The desire to limit financial distress is also a particularly strong determinant of asset allocation in defined benefit schemes. Although much of the existing empirical evidence supports the presence of risk management, and not asset substitution/risk shifting, earlier work fails to address a crucial point. If firms do not receive a concomitant reduction in overall firm risk then the necessity or motivation for undertaking pension risk management is unclear.
We make four main contributions to the extant literature on risk transparency and risk management. First we analyse whether the market correctly prices pension risk. If the market does not correctly incorporate pension risks companies will be mispriced in a standard risk-return context. We extend the analysis of Jin, Bodie, and Merton (2004) by considering the impact of different types of pension risk. Rather than deriving a beta for the total pension exposure we analyse whether funding and scheme size are reflected in measures of systematic risk. We do this because a large pension scheme is markedly different from a poorly funded scheme and so both factors are therefore separate risk factors.
Second, we analyse whether measures of firm-level operational distress reflect the risk of the pension scheme. Pension schemes with greater liabilities and volatile risky assets are prone to large swings in their net surplus/deficit position. Consequently, these risks should be reflected in measures of operating distress 1 . Firms that have higher levels of operating distress can opt to manage their pension risk by investing pension portfolio assets into less volatile securities. We would therefore expect that those firms with higher levels of operational distress to invest more pension assets in bonds. Higher levels of operating distress within in the firm is characterised by lower levels of cash being generated from ongoing projects and investments. Consequently the firm is less able to provide additional finance to the pension scheme, an investment in bonds therefore creates a more predictable and stable pension cost and limits the need to provide exceptional finance.
Third, we analyse the relation between firm financial distress, pension liabilities, funding, and asset allocation. We argue that firms with higher levels of financial distress are likely to have higher pension liabilities and lower funding levels. Large pension liabilities and deficits represent large constraints on the firm as it must fund the scheme through cash contributions from the firm and employees. In terms of asset allocation, higher levels of financial distress imposes a cash flow risk on firms and risky pension assets may exacerbate that risk because of the higher probability of additional funding being required in poor market conditions. Bonds provide a more predictable cash flow and thus a more predictable pension costs for highly leveraged firms. As a result we would expect those firms with higher levels of financial distress to allocate a larger percentage of pension assets to bonds.
Finally, we examine the relationship between firm-level default risk, pension liabilities and the level of funding in the pension scheme. If pension liabilities are large and funding of the scheme is low, the likelihood of default is higher. A high default probability provides a setting whereby risk management and risk shifting incentives are strongest [Rauh (2007) ]. If risk shifting is observed in the pension portfolio then managers would allocate larger amounts of pension assets to equity when their firms have higher credit risk. Conversely if risk management is undertaken then a higher percentage of pension assets would be invested in less risky assets, namely bonds.
1 Following Andrade and Kaplan (1998) we measure firm-level operational distress as the return on assets.
In examining market efficiency we consider the Fama-French 3-factor model (1993) . From this we analyse the relationship between firm risk, measured by beta and pension risk. Our results show that market risk reflects the risk of having a large pension liability and also a poorly funded scheme. This is an important finding as both risk factors are reflected by the market risk factor.
We then consider the relationship between value and growth risk factors and firm and pension risk. Intuitively we would expect these groups to have very different pension risk exposures. Value firms are characterised as having large pension exposures since they are more mature, while growth firms have lower exposure to pension risks since they are relatively smaller. Our results show that value firms are exposed to large pension liabilities and funding deficits. However, we find that size risk factors increase as pension risks fall. However, one possible explanation may be due to migration effects [Fama and French (2007) ]. Over time, successful high-growth companies migrate from growth to value portfolios. As a firm's exposure to size risk falls, i.e. they become larger, then their pension risk exposure increases as they migrate towards the value portfolio.
Our results also suggest that measures of operating distress reflect both the size and deficit of the pension scheme. Those firms that have higher operating distress are therefore more exposed to larger pension liabilities and lower funding ratios. Further, we find that firms with higher levels of operational risk tend to have a larger portion of pension assets allocated to bonds. This is consistent with pension risk management. In this situation there is a lower probability that the pension scheme will require additional financing since the pension assets are more stable.
We also report that firms with higher financial distress have larger pension liabilities relative to market value. This finding also holds for the surplus/deficit position of the scheme and so higher financial distress is linked to large pension funding deficits relative to market capitalisation. Further, the observed pension asset allocation is consistent with risk management and so those firms with higher levels of financial distress allocate a greater amount of pension assets to bonds.
An examination of default probability suggests that the size of the pension liability relative to the firm is associated with a higher probability of default. In analysing the composition of the pension portfolio however we do not observe any relation between probability of default and pension scheme asset allocation.
In Section 2, we discuss the various risk management strategies that firms can undertake. Section 3 presents the relevant literature and the hypotheses are developed in Section 4. Data and Methodology is discussed in Section 5, results are presented in Section 6 and we conclude in Section 7.
RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN PENSION SCHEMES
The adoption of fair value pension accounting in the UK has highlighted the risks that defined benefit pension obligations pose to firms. Management have to address these risks, since they face considerable pressure from investors, employees and pension trustees to ensure the solvency of both the firm and the scheme. Investors are naturally concerned that the scheme will be a drain on the cash flow of the firm thereby reducing the return on firm investment, while employees and trustees are concerned that management will under-fund the scheme, reducing the long-term security of their own benefits.
The most common form of pension scheme risk management is liability driven investment. This is achieved through liability duration matching, where the investment strategy of a scheme is designed to take account of plan-specific characteristics such as the composition of the firm's workforce, industry type, and sensitivity of the scheme to changes in inflation and interest rates. Most pension portfolio allocation strategies are founded on the rationale that equities outperform bonds in the long term and the total return on equity meets the future pension liability. This strategy however is not always effective. Under fair value accounting, the year-on-year fluctuation in asset values are reflected in the reported plan assets, which results in an increase in balance sheet and scheme funding volatility. Furthermore, when funding deteriorates, the firm may have to provide additional finance to ensure the solvency of the scheme, with a concomitant impact on the income statement.
Pension liability calculations are very sensitive to changes in both inflation and interest rates. Although it is possible to estimate the duration of a scheme's liabilities and assets, there is generally a value mismatch because of the long investment horizons associated with pension liabilities. Significant mismatches will cause asset and liability movements to differ when changes in interest rates occur. Consequently, the funding level of mismatched schemes can deteriorate quite substantially over time if the tracking error between plan assets, liabilities and interest rates is large.
Liability driven investment strategies therefore attempt to increase the duration of the pension plan assets. This can be done in a number of ways, the most common of which is a significant increase in long-term bonds within the pension portfolio. Although increased duration can also be achieved through the use of fixed income derivative products, this is unlikely to occur since it introduces counter-party risks and may also put pressure on the liquidity of the scheme and firm at some point in the future.
RELEVANT LITERATURE

Risk Management Vs Risk Shifting Effects
There is a substantial literature that considers whether managers adopt risk management or risk shifting strategies. Managers face conflicting incentives to manage risk, particularly when their firms are most constrained i.e. high default risk. In this situation, firms trade-off the ability to undertake new investments [Mayers and Smith (1987) ] with the need to ensure liquidity so as to prevent bankruptcy [Smith and Stultz (1985) ]. Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit risk shifting in this situation, whereby, undertaking riskier strategies increases shareholder value as firms move towards distress.
In this case, the risky project, if successful, leads to a much larger pay-off which increases shareholder value as opposed to bankruptcy where shareholders experience total loss.
There is very little empirical research that reports strong evidence of risk shifting in pension funds. Cocco and Volpin (2007) find some evidence in a small sample of UK firms. However, they focus on the governance of pension schemes rather than firm risk.
Essentially, firms with lower levels of governance allocate more pension assets to equity and pay lower contributions to the pension scheme since this maximises shareholder value.
Pension Portfolio Composition
There are a number of theoretical papers which show that the optimal allocation of pension assets should be concentrated in bonds. Both Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) show that this should be true for tax reasons. Essentially the use of bonds allows for some risk reduction in the portfolio and where bonds are the sole asset class in the portfolio a dollar change in the pension plan surplus, before tax (t), increases the value of the firm by $(1-t).
There are other incentives that may dictate why firms invest in other asset classes.
A wide range of assets in the pension portfolio offers access to asset classes to which investors would otherwise not have access [Campbell and Viceira (2005) ]. With respect to investments, individuals generally overweight their exposure to property and underweight all other assets classes that have a large effect on household consumption [Case, Quigley and Schiller (2005) ]. A broader range of pension portfolio assets therefore provides households with a more diversified portfolio. Alternatively, firms may also wish to offer the upside potential of riskier assets to employees since individuals are underweight in most assets [Sweeting (2005) ].
The objectives of the pension fund also come into effect in this situation. If the firm only provides the scheme to generate retirement incomes for current and former employees, the optimal portfolio will be one that follows a Black (1980) , Tepper (1981) and Bodie (1990) investment strategy which will be dominated by long dated, high quality corporate debt. Alternatively firms may wish to minimise the long-term cost of the pension scheme, as well as offering potential upside gains to shareholders. In this situation, management will adopt a total return strategy and pension assets will be invested predominantly in equity.
However, pension assets have consistently been shown to be a useful tool for management who can manipulate the pension accounting assumptions to smooth the earnings figures of the firm [Bergstresser, Desai and Rauh (2006) ]. Investment in more volatile assets classes, such as equity, creates an incentive for management to manipulate earnings through the discretionary setting of pension plan accounting assumptions.
Risk Transparency and Value Transparency
The first part of our analysis looks at risk transparency, where the risk of the firm is a function of the risk of the pension scheme. There are a limited number of papers in this area and they have shown that the stock market is able to price the underlying pension risks despite the opaque accounting that surrounds pensions. Most recently Jin, Bodie and Merton (2006) for the US, and Trivendi and Young (2006) for the UK, have
shown that the stock market reflects the underlying risk of the pension scheme.
Research on value transparency [Bodie, Light, Morck and Taggert (1985) , Bulow, Morck and Summers (1987) and Bodie and Papke (1992) ] has found that equity market valuations incorporate information in the annual report about the pension scheme, and that the surplus or deficit in a scheme is a determinant of equity market values. However, all of the research so far has focussed on US data, and fall under a very different pension accounting regime to the one in which all countries are moving towards.
U.S. pension accounting is guided by SFAS-87. Under this regime there is a
smoothing of pension costs and volatility of pension assets. Further, there is a complex mandatory contributions system that is triggered if scheme funding falls below a certain threshold. Under fair value -the situation in the U.K. -pension assets and liabilities are annually marked to market and so there is greater volatility in both the funding level of the scheme and pension assets. Consequently, this volatility may impair the relevance of any accounting amounts in the financial reports.
There is still some debate on the value transparency of pension assets and liabilities. First is the view that the assets and liabilities of the pension scheme are the assets and liabilities of the firm. Surpluses should thus be reflected as assets of the firm, which is generally the starting point for research in this area. However, there is also a view that only the liability/deficit of the scheme should be considered. This is because the pension assets belong to the members and so the scheme should be viewed as a separate legal entity of the firm [Weidman and Weir (2003) ].
Carroll and Neihaus (1998) address this issue by looking at the relevance of pension funding and corporate debt ratings. They show that for every dollar decrease in scheme funding, there is a dollar fall in firm market value. However, a dollar increase in the surplus of a pension scheme does not actually increase the value of the firm by a dollar. This is consistent with the notion that the cost of the pension liability is fully the responsibility of the firm. Surplus assets however, are not really the assets of the firm since the firm may not be able to access the surplus, and in any event the firm will have to pay tax on any assets that can be returned.
MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESES
The most recent paper to exam risk transparency of corporate pension schemes is Jin et al (2006) , who derived a beta measure for pension scheme risks and showed that the total risk of equity, measured by the CAPM beta, incorporated their beta for pension risks. Our approach is different in that we investigate whether extended measures of systematic risk (i.e. Fama-French size and value factors) reflect the individual components of pension risks. To create pension risk measures, we scale the liability and pension surplus/deficit by firm size. If we observe that higher pension liabilities and smaller pension surpluses, relative to the size of the firm, are associated with higher risk estimates, this would suggest that the market incorporates pension risk when assessing companies.
As noted in Jin et al (2006) there are a number reasons why this may not be the case. First, pension accounting is complicated and the values that are presented in the financial accounts are the result of complex estimates about interest rates, future earnings and life expectancy. Second, there are two very distinct views on how the pension scheme relates to the firm. The labour economics view is that the pension scheme is a distinct legal entity to the firm. Consequently, only deficits would be a risk factor in this view of the world. Alternatively, there is the corporate finance view, where both the assets and liabilities belong to the firm. In this situation we would expect that the size of the pension liability, and any surplus/deficit would be incorporated into measures of risk.
We include book to market equity and size to control for different firm characteristics. In general, larger firms have bigger workforces with larger pension exposures where benefits are being provided. Conversely, small firms will have a smaller exposure to pension risks by virtue of their size. Companies with stronger growth characteristics will have small workforces and be earlier in their life cycle. This would be in contrast to value firms that are likely to be later in their life cycle and be more exposed to pension risks than growth firms.
H1: Systematic risk measures do not reflect the underlying risks of the pension scheme.
In trying to further assess the relationship between firm risks and pension risk we consider two additional measures of firm risk. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) analyse a number of different risk characteristics of firms that undertook leveraged transactions that terminated in financial distress. Their analysis considers two different types of risk, financial distress (debt-to-equity) and operating distress (Return on Assets). We therefore apply these measures to reflect the operating and financial distress of our sample firms.
Our first measure considers financial distress, which is measured as the debt-toequity ratio of the firm. Firms with higher levels of financial distress are likely to have large pension schemes as they represent a large cost to the firm. Further, poorly funded schemes will put additional constraints on the cash flow of the firm since there may be a need to provide additional financing in the future, putting pressure on the ability of the to service its debt. Firms with higher levels of financial distress would be expected to have pension schemes that are poorly funded.
H2: The financial distress of the firm is unrelated to pension risk characteristics of the firm.
Our second measure of firm risk is operating distress, measured as the return on assets. The return on assets reflects the ability of the firm to generate cash flow from its investments. Jin et al (2006) analyse the relation between their pension risk beta and show that pension risks are associated with higher levels of operating distress.If the return on assets is low, the firm will have less cash flow to maintain ongoing projects, undertake new investments and service its debts. Pension risks may therefore pose a real risk to the ongoing operations of the firm. Firms with large pension deficits would have to provide additional contributions to their scheme.
H3: The operating distress of the firm is unrelated to pension risk characteristics of the firm.
In analysing the probability of default in the firm, pension risks are likely to be a contributing factor to an increased risk of default in the firm. This is likely where the size of the pension scheme relative to the firm is large. Further, where a pension deficit is large relative to the firm, the shortfall in funding of the pension scheme increases the likelihood that additional finance will be required. Again this may impact upon the probability of default. One further relationship that may hold is between the debt of the firm, the pension deficit and the probability of firm default. High levels of leverage in firms, increases the probability of bankruptcy in the firm. As a result of the binding nature of pension liabilities it is possible that the level of debt in the firm and the pension deficit are jointly related to the probability of default in the firm.
H4: The probability of firm default is unrelated to the risks of the pension scheme
To examine whether risk shifting or risk management occurs we analyse the relation between portfolio composition and our different risk factors. Our first risk measures are systematic risk. If equity is the dominant asset class in the pension portfolio and firm beta is high then this is implies that managers implement risk shifting.
Conversely, if high levels of systematic risk are associated with higher allocations to bonds this is consistent with risk management of the pension risk.
H5: Pension portfolio composition is unrelated to the systematic risks of the firm
With respect to firm leverage, the pension portfolio composition will reflect conscious decisions by management on how the pension liability is managed. If risk shifting is observed, equity would be the dominant asset in the pension portfolio.
Alternatively, if management undertake risk management, we would expect pension assets to be predominantly invested in bonds.
H6: Pension portfolio composition is unrelated to the financial distress of the firm.
The ability of the firm to finance its ongoing operations is a tangible current risk to the firm, while the capital structure of the firm represents a long-term risk to the firm. This is therefore another environment where risk shifting and risk management incentives may be particularly strong. When faced with limited financial resources, a risk management strategy (predominance of bonds) would result in a relatively stable and predictable pension cost. Although more volatile assets over the long-term may meet the pension liability on a total return basis, this strategy could expose the firm to large intermittent pension contributions which would increase their operating distresss further.
H7: Pension portfolio composition is unrelated to the operating distress of the firm.
Following much of the literature on risk-shifting and risk management we consider the role of default, as measured by Altman's Z-Score. Risk management and risk shifting is most likely to occur in firms in financial distress. Firms with high default risk can shift value from bondholders to equity holders by undertaking risky projects.
Prior research however has found little evidence of risk shifting. Many studies, most recently Rauh (2007) , have found that that as the probability of default increases, firms allocate more of their pension assets to safer securities. and not all firms adopted the standard at the start of the sample period. The level of disclosure therefore in the early part of the sample is low and improves over time.
H8: The asset allocation of the pension scheme is unrelated to the probability of default in the firm
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
FRS-17 is the new fair value accounting standard that covers pension accounting in the UK and was replaced in 2005 with IAS 19. However, much of the disclosure requirements under both standards are the same 2 . When firms comply with FRS-17, they present in the financial accounts different asset classes compositions of the defined benefit pension scheme. This allows us to collect data for equities, bonds, property and cash in each scheme for every year in the sample. From this, we sum the individual asset classes to calculate the total pension assets. We also calculate the surplus(deficit) of the pension scheme by summing total pension assets and total pension liabilities. To characterise the pension portfolio assets, we calculate the percentage of total pension assets composed of equity and the percentage of pension assets invested in bonds.
Daily share price data and FTSE All Share market index data, year end market capitalisation, total assets, book value of equity, total debt, return on assets, earnings before interest and tax, retained earnings and sales are collected from Worldscope.
The pension liability and funding variables are each scaled by the market capitalisation of the firm because the standardised measure more accurately reflects the risk that the scheme poses to the firm. For example, although a pension deficit of £50m
is a large number, relative to a firm with a market capitalisation of £10bn, the amount is relatively small. However, if the market value of the firm was £100m, the deficit of the pension of the scheme would be very large, since it constitutes 50% of the firm's market value.
From the stock returns data, we calculate both the market model beta where, In looking at the total assets and debt of the firms in the sample, both measures increase over our sample period. For total assets, the median is considerably lower than the mean. This high level of skewness is driven by the largest firms in the sample. This is also evident when the total debt of the sample firms is considered, since the median is appreciably lower than the mean in all years.
We also consider a number of firm risk characteristics. The next section of the table presents the operating distress, financial distress and the probability of default in the firm. The operating distress of the firm is measured as the return on assets. It is clear that the average and median return on assets is relatively stable over the sample period.
Financial distress is measured by the debt-to-equity ratio of the firm. As with operating distress, this is broadly similar year-on-year and with an average debt-to-equity ratio of 26 percent.
The probability of bankruptcy is measured from Altman's Z-Score. In all years, the mean score is greater than 3 and so on average firms are not likely to experience bankruptcy. However, it is also clear that there are a number of firms that lie within the grey area between 1.8 and 3. Of the firms in our sample, we therefore have a number of companies where there is an increased risk of bankruptcy. This is important since one of the key areas that we consider is the relationship between default probability, pension schemes risk and pension asset allocation.
The final section of table 1 shows the different betas that were calculated. We present the standard market model beta, the Dimson beta and the Fama-French market beta. The Dimson beta was calculated to mitigate the problem where the risk of those shares that are traded most frequently is overestimated and the risk of those shares that are thinly traded is underestimated. Following the methodology of Dimson (1979) we calculated two different beta specifications, one lead and one lag, and two leads and two 
RESULTS
In this section, we explicitly test the hypotheses that were developed in section 6.0. Section 6.1 examines the relationship between pension risk and measures of systematic risk. Section 6.2 discusses financial distress and pension risk. Section 6.3
analyses the relationship between pension risk, operating distress and default risk.
Section 6.4 examines pension portfolio composition, systematic risk and the FamaFrench factors. 6.5 analyses pension asset allocation and financial distress. Section 6.6 looks at the relationship between operating distress and probability of default with pension portfolio asset allocation. Lastly in section 6.7 we analyse the impact of active risk management on measures of firm risk.
PENSION RISK AND SYSTEMATIC RISK MEASURES
The first part of the analysis considers market efficiency and risk transparency. If markets are efficient, a firm's systematic risk (beta) will be higher when the pension liability is large relative to the size of the firm. The same rationale applies to the deficit of a pension scheme.
From Table 3 , it is clear there is a significant and positive relationship between systematic risk (beta) and the pension liability. Further we find a significantly negative relation with the pension surplus. In both cases, a large pension liability and significant pension deficit relative to the size of the firm increases corporate risk. Due to the complexity and opacity of pension accounting, this is an unexpected result but strongly suggestive of market efficiency and transparent assessment of risk.
The next systematic risk measure we examine is the HML factor. From Table 3 , it can be seen that corporate exposure to the HML risk factor is higher when firms have large positive exposures to pension risks, large pension liabilities being significant and positive and pension deficits being significant and negative. This is consistent with market efficiency, since both the size of the pension scheme and the size of the pension deficit are captured by the value risk factor.
The final column of Table 3 analyses the relationship between the SMB factor and pension risks. Interestingly we find that higher size risk factors are associated with smaller pension liabilities relative to firm size. Further we find that there is no relation between the size risk factor and the surplus or deficit of the pension scheme.
We can therefore reject our null for hypothesis 1 that the market does not incorporate pension risk measures. Our results extend those of Jin et al (2006) since we show that not only does the market price pension risks of the firm but that it also prices the different individual components of pension risk. related to the size of the pension liability relative to the market value of the firm. This is consistent with expectations, since a large scheme, regardless of funding, is a significant burden on the firm. Firms with a large pension scheme liability tend to have a large number of active, retired, and deferred scheme members and this will increase the annual service cost. We can therefore reject our second null hypothesis that measures of financial distress are unrelated to pension scheme risks.
PENSION RISK AND MEASURES OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS
We then consider the relationship between financial distress and pension scheme funding. Funding is measured as the pension surplus/(deficit) scaled by the market capitalisation of the firm. From column 2 of table 4, firms that have a bigger pension deficit relative to firm size also have higher levels of financial distress. Again this is consistent with expectations. Firms with large pension short-falls are likely to require additional funding for their pension scheme. As a result, firms have additional pressures on their cash flow and therefore experience higher levels of financial distress. Again we can reject our second null hypothesis that measures of financial distress do not incorporate measures of a firms pension risks.
Measuring pension liabilities and funding using total assets as the scaling instrument causes the regression models to lose power. As a result, the models in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 are insignificant. Given that the distress variable debt to equity is market determined this is not a particularly surprising result.
PENSION RISK AND MEASURES OF OPERATING DISTRESS AND DEFAULT PROBABILITY
In panel A of table 5 we present our analysis of operating distress and pension risk. Following Jin et al (2006) , operating distress is measured as the return on assets. A firm with a low return on assets generates inferior amounts of income from its investments causing it to have less free cash flow. Under such constraints the firm will be less able to finance ongoing projects, undertake new investments and service any debts that the company may have. A large pension liability would have a significant impact upon the level of operating distress in the firm and, as noted earlier, large pension liabilities are associated with substantial contributions. This would reduce free cash flow, further increasing the level of operating distress in the firm. From the first regression in panel A, there is a significantly negative relation between the return on assets and the size of the pension liability. We can therefore reject our null hypothesis 3 that operating distress is unrelated to pension risks since increased operating distress is associated with large pension risk exposures.
In looking at the level of funding in the pension scheme, the second regression in Panel A shows a significant and positive relationship between the pension surplus/deficit and return on assets. Again this is consistent with expectations. If a scheme is well funded or even in surplus, the firm will have to contribute less and in certain circumstances may even underfund the scheme. Conversely, a scheme in deficit will force the firm to provide additional funds thereby reducing cash flow and increasing operating distress. Again we can reject our null hypothesis that the operating risk is unrelated to pension risks within the firm.
Panel B of table 5 presents an analysis of pension risks and the probability of default. There are a number of reasons to expect that the size of the pension liability will contribute to the likelihood of default in the firm. Large pension liabilities represent a significant burden to firms. Moreover, pension liabilities are also debt-like in nature, and in some respects, could be considered to be an additional form of gearing in the firm.
Our results, from the first regression in panel B, suggest that there is an increased likelihood of bankruptcy when the pension scheme is large relative to the firm. We can therefore reject our fourth null hypothesis that the probability of default is unrelated to pension risk.
The second regression in panel B presents results for the probability of default and scheme funding. Interestingly, there is no significant relationship between funding and default. This is contrary to expectations. However, since pension funding could be classed as a short-term risk, large asset swings or special one-off contributions could mitigate the impact of poor funding levels. However, for our other measures of distress, funding exacerbates these problems.
PENSION ASSET ALLOCATION AND SYSTEMATIC RISK
When firms are constrained, managers face conflicting incentives to undertake risk management or risk shifting. Rauh (2007) analysed risk shifting and risk management for US defined benefit pension schemes and found strong evidence of risk management in response to scheme funding and credit ratings. Our analysis extends the analysis of Rauh (2007) by examining a number of different measures of risk and distress to test for either risk shifting or risk management.
Following Rauh (2007) , we regress the pension portfolio composition i.e. the percentage of pension assets invested in equities/bonds against measures of distress and risk. The sign of the regression coefficient allows for an assessment of the relation between pension portfolio asset allocation, firm risk and whether risk management or risk shifting is observed. Jensen and Meckling (1976) posited the notion of risk shifting. In circumstances where firm risk is increasing or is higher, managers may increase the volatility of investments they undertake, since this maximises the value of shareholders' equity by offering potentially larger payoffs. If risk shifting were to be observed in the pension portfolio, we would expect pension assets to be composed mainly of equities.
Consequently, if equity allocation in the pension portfolio is the dependent variable in a regression, for risk shifting to be observed, the coefficient on the risk factor would be significant and positive. Conversely, risk management would be observed where there is a significantly higher weighting of bonds in the portfolio in relation to risk since this is indicative of liability driven investment. Table 6 presents the results for pension risk management and measures of systematic risk. From the regression results, higher measures of market risk are associated with significantly lower equity allocations and significantly higher bond allocations in the pension portfolio. A unit change in the market risk of the firm is associated with a 6% decrease in the equity allocation of pension assets and a 5% increase in bonds. The fact that we do not observe a 1:1 matching may be because asset class diversification is being undertaken. We can therefore reject our null that pension portfolio asset allocation is unrelated to measures of firm risk.
The regressions also present an analysis of pension asset allocation and the FamaFrench risk factors. We do not find any relationship between the value risk factor and pension portfolio asset allocation. For the size risk sensitivity factor we find that increases in size risk are associated with higher equity allocations. This may indicate a risk-shifting. However, the percentage of pension assets invested in equity has been shown to be positively related to firm size [Barth Beaver and Landsman (1993) ].
Investing a larger component of pension assets in equity may therefore be a way in which size risk sensitivity is being managed.
PENSION ASSET ALLOCATION AND MEASURES OF FIRM DISTRESS
The next part of our analysis considers the relationship between pension portfolio asset allocation and measures of firm distress. As with measures of systematic risk, this allows for an assessment of whether risk shifting or risk management is observed when firms have higher levels of distress.
Higher levels of financial distress constrain the finances of the firm since debt has to be serviced. Management have two choices when faced with increased levels of distress in the firm. First, undertake risk shifting through increasing the allocation of pension assets to volatile asset classes, namely equity. Alternatively, managers can choose to reduce the volatility of pension assets by investing more in bonds. In so doing, the firm would incur a more stable pension cost and for managers this option would reduce the likelihood of further financial distress. An allocation to riskier assets, however, may exacerbate the financial distress of the firm at some point in the future if there are adverse equity movements. Table 7 presents the results. It is clear that when financial distress is higher, controlling for the probability of default in the firm, there is a significantly higher allocation to safer pension assets. This result is consistent with risk management of pension risks. For example, firms that experience a 1% increase in the ratio of debt to equity will reduce their allocation of pension assets in equity by 0.03% and increase their exposure to bonds by 0.04%. We can thus reject our null hypothesis 6 that pension portfolio allocation is unrelated to financial distress within the firm. Economically however, the relation between pension asset allocation and financial distress is very small. If the debt-to-equity ratio of the firm increased by 50% this would only result in a 1.5% decrease in the percentage of equity in pension assets. Table 8 shows the results of an analysis of pension asset allocation and operating distress. Similar to financial distress, operating distress reflects a situation where the firm has cash flow constraints. A low return on assets reflects an inability within the firm to generate returns on their investments. In such a situation the firm does not have sufficient scope to pay large amounts of additional finance to a poorly funded pension scheme. Consequently, if pension assets have a higher bond weighting they will be more stable, reducing the likelihood of the firm to provide large amounts of additional finance to the scheme.
The regression results show that the firm allocates significantly lower amounts of pension assets to equity and significantly higher amounts to bonds when operating distress is higher. From the regression results, a 10 percentage point fall in the return on assets would be associated with a 4.0 percentage point decrease in assets allocated to equity and a 3.6 percentage point increase in bonds. This is again consistent with risk management of pension risk, and so we can reject our null hypothesis 7 that pension portfolio composition is unrelated to operating distress.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper considers two important questions relating to market efficiency and risk management. First we look for risk transparency between measures of systematic risk, firm distress and pension risks. Our results show that measures of systematic risk, namely market, value (HML), and size (SMB) risk, reflect the underlying risk of the pension scheme. Moreover, both market and value risk are influenced by the size of the pension liability and the funding of the pension scheme relative to firm market capitalisation. This finding is significant because there are many reasons to suspect that systematic risk factors would not price these risks. Pension accounting is governed by complex and opaque accounting methods and, in many respects, are 'off balance sheet'.
However, we find that measures of systematic risk reflect these pension risks and so we find evidence of market efficiency.
Our analysis also extends the literature on risk transparency to consider measures of operating distress, financial distress and default. Again, firms with higher levels of operating and financial distress are characterised by having large pension liabilities and poor levels of funding in their pension scheme. Our analysis of default probability shows that only the size of the pension liability relative to the firm is a significant determinant of default.
The second part of our paper considers pension risk management. We present evidence of pension risk management as firm risk and levels of distress increase.
Managers actively allocate pension assets away from risky investments to safer assets. If equity is the dominant asset in the pension portfolio then large swings in the stock market can have a significant impact upon the funding level of the pension scheme. In this situation, firms may have to provide additional contributions to the scheme. However, those firms that are the riskiest and most constrained, are least able to do so. Mangers therefore choose to manage these risks by allocating pension assets to safer securities, namely bonds. This provides the pension scheme with a more stable portfolio and managers with a more predictable pension cost. Market Capitalisation is the balance sheet market value of equity. Total assets are the year end total assets of the firm. Total debt is the total debt outstanding of the firm for the year. Operating distress is the return on assets (ROA). Financial distress is the level of gearing in the firm measured by the debt-to-equity ratio. The Z-Score is the probability of default in the firm measured by Altman's Z-Score. The market model beta is the beta of the firm with no lags Liability/Market value is the FRS 17 pension liability divided by the balance sheet market value of the firm. Surplus/Market Value is the sum of pension assets and liabilities divided by the balance sheet date market value of equity. We also include controls for firm size and capital structure and book-to-market. The dependant variable is presented at the head of each column and the independent variables are present in the far left hand column. The parameter estimate is presented in the top row and the corresponding t-stat is presented directly below, * indicates significance at 99% and **indicates significance at 95% and *** indicates significance at 10%. Table 4 presents the results of pooled regressions of financial against pension scheme risks. We estimate financial distress as the level of gearing in the firm measured by the debt-to-equity ratio. Liability/Market value is the FRS 17 pension liability divided by the balance sheet market value of the firm. Surplus/Market Value is the sum of pension assets and liabilities divided by the balance sheet date market value of equity. Liability/Total Assets is the FRS 17 pension liability divided by the total assets of the firm. Surplus/Total Assets is the sum of pension assets and liabilities divided by the Total Assets of the firm. We also include controls for firm size and book-to-market. The dependant variable is presented at the head of each column and the independent variables are present in the far left hand column. The parameter estimate is presented in the top row and the corresponding t-stat is presented directly below, * indicates significance at 99% and **indicates significance at 95% and *** indicates significance at 10%. Table 5 presents the results of pooled regressions of operating and default risks against pension scheme risks. We estimate operating distress as the return on assets (ROA). The Z-Score measures the probability of default measured by Altman's Z-Score. Liability/Market value is the FRS 17 pension liability divided by the balance sheet market value of the firm. Surplus/Market Value is the sum of pension assets and liabilities divided by the balance sheet date market value of equity. We also include controls for firm size (log MV) and the capital structure of the firm measured by debt-to-equity. The dependant variable is presented at the in the far left hand column and the independent variables are presented at the head of each column. The parameter estimate is presented in the top row and the corresponding t-stat is presented directly below in parenthesis, * indicates significance at 99% and **indicates significance at 95% and *** indicates significance at 10%. Table 6 presents the results of pooled regressions of pension asset allocation against the Fama-French 3-factor parameter estimates. We calculate the market beta and the size and book value risk factors from the Fama-French 3-Factor model where, . In the far left column are the dependant variables pension equity percentage and pension debt percentage and along the top row are the independent variables. We control for firm size log(market value), book-to-market equity value and the capital structure of the firm measured by the debt-to-equity ratio. The parameter estimate is presented in the top row and the corresponding t-stat is presented directly below in parenthesis, * indicates significance at 99% and **indicates significance at 95% and *** indicates significance at 10%. Table 7 presents the results of pooled regressions of pension asset allocation against financial distress, measured by the debt-to-equity ratio of the firm. At the head of each column is pension asset allocation. In the far left column are the explanatory variables. We control for firm size log(market value), book-tomarket equity value and the probability of default in the firm measured by Altman's Z-Score. The parameter estimate is presented in the top row and the corresponding t-stat is presented directly below, * indicates significance at 99% and **indicates significance at 95% and *** indicates significance at 10%. Table 8 presents the results of pooled regressions of pension asset allocation against operating distress, measured by the return on assets. At the head of each column is pension asset allocation. In the far left column are the explanatory variables. The far left column is the dependant variables pension equity percentage and pension debt percentage and along the top row are the independent variables. We control for firm size log(market value), book-to-market equity value and the capital structure of the firm measured by the debt-to-equity ratio. The parameter estimate is presented in the top row and the corresponding t-stat is presented directly below, * indicates significance at 99% and **indicates significance at 95% and *** indicates significance at 10%. 
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